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I. INTRODUCTION
The time had come for Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to urge Congress
to give him more power, a lot more power. It was the middle of September 2008,
the United States’ financial thermometer was about to pop as the spark that was the
United States housing and mortgage crisis had grown into a raging financial wild
fire.1 The housing bubble burst of 2006 had kindled a ‘mortgage default crisis’
that proceeded to bankrupt homeowners and lenders nationwide.2 The ‘crisis’
grew and grew, spreading uncontrollably, until at last the investment ties to the
‘Main Street’ mortgage lenders caught ablaze and nothing could stop the crisis
from roaring into Wall Street.3 Financial giants burned, markets boiled over.4
Investors threw their panic like gasoline onto the towering flames, unloading
securities in fear of a free fall.5 The Treasury Department did what it could to
contain the insatiable inferno, but still it continued to rage, with no signs of
relenting.6
The immense heat of the mounting crisis bore down perhaps most sharply on
Paulson and the rest of those that worked, and indeed lived, in the Treasury
building (which at this point remained open around the clock, every day, with only
a tuna-fish and peanut-butter sandwich buffet to sustain those that tried to save the
economy).7 It had become apparent to Paulson by this time that despite his best
efforts, the financial crisis was on the verge of completely exploding. On
September 20, 2008, Paulson proposed the Troubled Asset Relief Program 8 to
Congress, a $700 billion capped bailout plan that created “a taxpayer-backed entity
that would acquire mortgage-backed bonds from banks” at Paulson’s discretion.9
Paulson’s enormous plea was crammed tightly within a two-and-a-half page

1

See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 21, 25 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 36–37, 39 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
7
Daniel Gross, The Captain of the Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 2008, available at http://www.
newsweek.com/id/160119/page/1.
8
Text Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html?_r=1&ref=business.
9
Gross, supra note 7, at 3.
2
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document in the hopes of being quickly passed by Congress. 10 Although lean, this
proposal was crowded. In addition to requesting the power to grant up to $700
billion to buy “troubled assets” (representative of one individual effectively
controlling five percent of the national gross domestic product), 11 Paulson also
asserted that this power should be free from any congressional or judicial review. 12
The panicked and weary nation stopped to take a collective gasp at the magnitude
of Paulson’s request: was the Secretary of Treasury going to become the most
powerful person in the world?
Even after Congress poured amendment after amendment into Paulson’s
proposal, striking section eight’s no review clause and adding numerous measures
of oversight, the nation and its leaders could not help but grimace to various
degrees at Paulson’s eventual powers under the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (“EESA”).13 The reaction was extreme. Historians and political
scientists alike quickly jumped to labeling Paulson as the most powerful Treasury
Secretary in the nation’s history.14 Many jumped even farther, begrudgingly

10

See Draft Proposal, supra note 8; Massimo Calabresi, Congress and the Bailout Plan: Business
As Usual, TIME, Sept. 23, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,18436421,00.html.
[Paulson] and his team had been working on his proposal for more than six
months, in the event that more piecemeal approaches like the bailout of Bear
Stearns or the takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac didn’t stop the bleeding.
When things looked like they were headed for a crisis at the beginning of last
week [(September 15)], he had a team up literally all night working with the
Federal Reserve to frame a deliberately vague proposal that could make it
through Congress. The key issue was to get something that could pass, and
quickly, as failure would produce a panic that would be unstoppable. What they
came up with was the broad, three-page plan giving the Treasury $700 billion to
buy back Wall Street’s toxic mortgage-backed assets and eventually repackage
and sell them.
Id.
11
Maura Reynolds & Peter G. Gosselin, Bailout Tab: $700,000,0000 Democrats Seek Oversight,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/21/nation/na-wallstreet21.
12
See Draft Proposal, supra note 8, at § 8 (“Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of
this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court
of law or any administrative agency.”).
13
Ryan Ellis, Tax Policy Director at Americans for Tax Reform, believed that Congress was
“appointing a financial dictator. Ellis continued stating, “. . . .Congress is giving a member of the
executive branch virtually unlimited power for the entire economy.” John Ward, Bill Gives Paulson
Unprecedented Power, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2008/oct/03/bill-would-hand-paulson-unprecedented-authority/. Former House Speaker Newt
Gingrich believed that “[a] plan that relies on the former chairman of Goldman Sachs presiding over
disbursing hundreds of billions of dollars to Wall Street is a terrible concept and inevitably will lead to
crony capitalism and the appearance of—if not the actual existence of—corruption.” Id. House
Representative Louie Gohmert further stated that “[s]ince this country started, since the Constitution in
1787 . . . this country has never done anything like this, given this much power to one person.”
Gohmert further stated, “It’s just wrong to our principles of American democracy to give one person
this kind of power.” Id.
14
Richard Sylla, New York University financial historian, stated:
Nothing quite of this scale has happened since the early years of the country
when Alexander Hamilton wrote the Treasury act to give him the power to
borrow and intervene in markets . . . . And in Hamilton’s case, Congress quickly
clipped his wings, and no successor not even under President Franklin D.
Roosevelt at the height of the Depression exercised quite such unfettered power
again.
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anointing Paulson as one of the most powerful men to have held any United States
office.15
Buzzwords like “financial dictator” became commonplace, the
“unprecedented” descriptor appeared so often next to the mention of the EESA that
one might figure it was part of the Congressional title. 16
But, was the EESA really so “unprecedented?” Yes, the $700 billion cap for
the newly established Troubled Asset Relief Program was historically significant
and indeed its management authorized great power, but when this power is
considered carefully in context with other powers given to Treasury Secretaries in
times past, Paulson hardly seems to be the unprecedented power-wielding giant
that many made him out to be. As many had seemingly forgotten, Congress has
been lifting Treasury Secretary authority to such heights since the ink had barely
dried upon the United States Constitution.
History places the EESA and Paulson at the back of a long line. Does the
EESA’s “leap” in authorized power really surpass the leap taken when Congress
authorized Alexander Hamilton to establish and manage a bailout of the early
American financial system worth 7/8 of the total national debt? 17 Or did the EESA
give more power to Paulson to address the 2008 financial crisis than that which
Congress gave Salmon Chase to essentially print money out of thin air to repay
Civil War debts?18 Or can it be said that the size of the 2008 bailout will shake up
the financial landscape more than it had been shaken when William G. McAdoo
personally shut down the New York Stock Exchange for more than four months? 19
United States Treasury Secretaries have faced financial crises stemming
from a multitude of varied causes throughout the nation’s 232-year history.

Reynolds, supra note 11. John Ward of the Washington Times argued:
Historical precedent for a Treasury secretary this powerful is hard to find:
Alexander Hamilton enforced taxes by leading an army to suppress the whiskey
rebellion; William G. McAdoo shut down the New York Stock Exchange during
World War I; Salmon P. Chase issued currency during the Civil War that he later
ruled unconstitutional as a Supreme Court justice; and Robert Morris personally
guaranteed promissory notes during the days after the Revolutionary War, when
the nation had virtually no credit. Mr. Paulson’s authority in the bill, as written
Thursday, is likely to surpass all of those.
Ward, supra note 13. Peter Grier of the Christian Science Monitor further stated, “Henry Paulson Jr.
has become one of the most famous and, perhaps, consequential US Treasury secretaries since
Alexander Hamilton assumed the office on Sept. 11, 1789.” Peter Grier, Treasury Chief Paulson on
Verge of Historic New Powers, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0923/p01s06-usec.html.
15
John Ward of the Washington Times further believed that “[i]n all of American history, it is
likely that no government official besides a wartime president has ever been given as much power over
taxpayer money as Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. would receive under the $700 billion
financial rescue plan.” Ward, supra note 13. Julian Zelizer, a political history professor at Harvard’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government stated that:
[Paulson’s authority] ranks with the top list of delegations of power, especially
since there’s some flexibility for Treasury in deciding what to do with all this
money . . . . Zelizer further stated, “You don’t like to give power over finance
and taxes to people who are not democratically accountable like Congress . . . .
Id.
16
See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
17
See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
18
See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
19
See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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Depending upon the severity and need of each crisis, Treasury Secretaries have
historically been granted very powerful authority to seek financial and economic
stability. The 2008 financial crisis, although unique in one sense, stands at the
back of a long line of financial challenges that have called for the acting Treasury
Secretary to seek and effectuate monumental powers. This article will analyze the
powers given to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson under the EESA and compare
such powers to those exercised by other Treasury Secretaries during past times of
financial crisis.
Part II of this article will summarize the financial crisis leading to the EESA.
Part III will consist of an analysis of the authority and power given to Paulson
under the EESA. Part IV will begin to shed light on how precedented Paulson’s
EESA powers really were, as the section will define the genesis of a congressional
trend to magnify Treasury Secretary authority in times of financial crisis by
examining the trend’s first and truly most powerful proponent, Alexander
Hamilton. Part V will further show that Paulson stands in the back of a rather long
line of extremely powerful Treasury Secretaries by briefly noting some of the most
historic residents of the line. Finally, Part VI will provide a brief conclusion to the
article.
II.

SUMMARY OF THE “CRISIS” LEADING TO THE EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008

Paulson had seen the economy boil to the crisis point for some time. The
dominos began tipping with the housing bubble burst in mid-2006, giving way to
widespread mortgage defaults and lender bankruptcies throughout 2007 and
2008.20 By the spring of 2008, the effect of the drastic increase of loan defaults
(especially sub-prime loan defaults) began to weigh down on investment banks
nationwide.21 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, “the Washington-based quasigovernmental firms that together guaranty or insure $5.4 trillion in mortgages,”
became increasingly strained.22 With the financial crisis alive and snowballing,
Paulson attempted to combat the spread of mortgage defaults by bringing together
the New Hope Coalition, “an industry-led group that would modify mortgages
before foreclosure.”23 Despite such efforts by Paulson, and several interest rate
20

Gross, supra note 7, at 2.
[T]he housing bubble burst in mid-2006; borrowers started defaulting on
mortgages and lenders began going belly up. The mortgages had been packaged
into exotic securities, sliced and diced and sold as bonds and purchased by
investment banks and hedge funds. Because lenders, executives and traders had
convinced themselves that home prices would never fall, anything went. The
result was debt layered on debt, piled on top of debt, supported by small amounts
of cash. And so as Americans in increasing numbers defaulted on their
mortgages in 2007 and 2008, it kicked off a domino effect. The value of the
mortgage-backed bonds fell, as did that of the financial instruments based on
those bonds. Banks were forced to write down the value of their holdings and
raise new cash from foreign sovereign-wealth funds—only to report fresh losses
as the housing market weakened.

21

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.

Id.
22
23
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cuts by the Federal Reserve, the financial crisis rolled into Wall Street with a full
head of steam as the investment giant Bear Sterns 24 announced that it had become
insolvent.25
The ramifications of an investment bank like Bear Sterns failing would have
been disastrous for a vast number of individuals, businesses, and financial
institutions; a vicious blow to an ever-weakening economy. Paulson intervened in
March of 2008, brokering a deal in which the investment bank JPMorgan Chase
received credit from the Federal Reserve to purchase Bear Sterns at a bargain
price.26 The move helped to avoid the immediate breakdown of the financial
market; however, Paulson must have known this could not be the end, as the crisis
ball was still barreling through Wall Street with several more investment banks in
its path.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to feel the pressure of vast mortgage
defaults into the summer.27 In July of 2008, Congress granted Paulson the
authority to aid the troubled institutions if he believed it to be necessary for
financial rebound.28 Paulson was optimistic that this action would not be
necessary however, as he had hoped that the promise of federal support to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac would be enough to rally investor trust in the companies
they insured.29 Unfortunately, his hopes in the already rattled investors would not
prove to be fruitful.
On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac essentially went from
‘quasi-governmental institutions’ to ‘nationalized’ institutions as Paulson
announced that the federal government would guaranty their debt and provide
them with much needed capital.30 Not more than a week after this unprecedented
bailout, Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”), another Wall Street investment giant, came
to Paulson seeking a Bear Sterns-like rescue.31 Paulson was concerned that a

24
Bear Sterns was the fifth largest U.S. securities firm at the time of the August announcement.
Alison Fitzgerald, As ‘Biggest Crisis’ Hit, Congress Held Nose and Backed Bailout, Oct. 6, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a2PslgpVvrCI&refer=home.
25
Gross, supra note 7, at 3.
26
Id.
Paulson knew the plan flew in the face of the free-market philosophy to which
he, and all his colleagues on Wall Street, clung so fiercely. But this was a special
case. When commercial banks failed, a tried-and-tested procedure kicked in: the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. took charge and made insured depositors whole.
But there was no existing protocol or regulatory framework to deal with the
failure of an investment bank. And because of its massive levels of debt and
significance in the markets for credit-default swaps—a sort of insurance policy
against investment losses—Bear Stearns had the capacity to harm hundreds of
financial institutions.
Id. When asked about the intervention in the Bear Sterns deal, Paulson told Newsweek, “The Federal
Reserve believed—and I supported them—that it was the right thing to come in and intervene.” Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. Paulson commented on such optimism to Newsweek:”‘If you’ve got a bazooka, and people
know you’ve got it, you may not have to take it out.” Id. Newsweek translated this statement as
follows: “if the market knew the companies had a federal backstop, investors would be more likely to
give them more time to work out their troubles.” Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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“backstop” precedent would have been set if he gave similar aid to Lehman. 32 A
precedent of federal aid may have given other similarly situated institutions the
idea that they really were ‘too big to fail’ and thus encouraged such institutions to
take greater risks, sending a message that there was a net to catch them if they
were to fall.33 Paulson also believed that a Lehman failure would not have
presented the same kind of dire consequences to the economy that the Bear Sterns
failure had.34 Paulson notified Lehman that he would not be coming to their
rescue.35 Lehman filed for bankruptcy soon afterwards, a signal that is thought to
have motivated the already teetering Merrill Lynch to quickly strike a deal with
Bank of America.36
However, Paulson’s strong-handed signal would not prove to be so frugal
after all, as only days later the ever-snowballing financial crisis rolled into the
doors of AIG; another financial giant that posed catastrophic economic
consequences for failure.37 September indeed proved to be the culmination of the
crisis. On September 16, 2008, Paulson announced that the federal government
was going to spend $85 billion to bailout AIG in exchange for an eighty percent
stake in the company and the power to install a new Chief Executive Officer. 38
AIG essentially became as nationalized as the once private Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
The financial market was at full panic as every investment bank and firm
was suspected to be the next giant to fall. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley’s
stock began to freefall as investors rushed to get out, “threatening to force them
into mergers with other firms.”39 Even money market funds became tainted with
suspicion as investors continued to pull their confidences. 40 When banks
nationwide began to refuse capital even to each other, Paulson knew the time had
come for drastic measures.41 September 20, 2008 had arrived. Paulson brought
his plight to Congress in a two-and-a-half page proposal for a $700 billion capped
bailout to be unilaterally controlled by the Treasury Department. 42 Although the
proposal was one that would lead to historic powers for him as the Secretary,
Paulson took no pleasure in its submission. 43

32

Gross, supra note 7, at 3.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. Paulson later stated at a press conference that he “‘never once considered that it was
appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in resolving Lehman Brothers.’” Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Gross, supra note 7, at 3; see also CBS News & Associated Press, U.S. Announces $85 Billion
Bailout of AIG: Federal Reserve Makes Emergency Loan to Keep Global Insurance Giant Afloat, Avoid
Deepening Financial Crisis, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/
main4453942.shtml.
39
Gross, supra note 7, at 3.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Gross reported:
It was a message [Paulson] never expected to deliver. Henry Paulson—freemarket thinker, former CEO of Goldman Sachs and Treasury secretary to a
33
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Even though many in Congress agreed that some intervention would likely
be necessary, it was an uphill battle for Paulson to push his proposal through
Congress.44 The day after Paulson proposed his initial bailout plan, he appeared on
several popular morning talk shows in an attempt to gain public support. 45 Within
days, Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke appeared before the
Senate Banking Committee46 and the House Financial Services Committee to
testify regarding the bailout plan.47 Paulson was met with a great deal of
opposition from both Republicans and Democrats on the issues of oversight and
judicial review.48 Several leaders of Congress further voiced their concerns of

conservative Republican president—was unveiling to the world a massive
taxpayer bailout of the American financial system. Afterward, as he headed into
yet another weekend of nonstop work with his team, carrying the weight of the
troubled markets on his shoulders, the former college-football star was clearly
conflicted about what he’d just proposed. “It’s very unpleasant for me, but it’s a
lot more attractive than the alternative . . . . We can spend a lot of time talking
about how it happened and how we got here. But we have to get through the
night first.”
....
While bailouts are regrettable and expensive, Paulson argues that one is needed
to restore confidence in the system. “We’re going to have housing issues and
mortgage issues for years . . . . The key is to get stability.”
Id. at 1, 4.
44
See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 24.
45
Id.
46
Jennifer Yousfi, Paulson and Bernanke Testify Before Congress in Favor of $700 Billion
Government Banking Bailout, MONEY MORNING, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.moneymorning.com/2008
/09/23/government-bailout-plan/.
47
Joseph Goldstein, Bernanke, Paulson Face Tough Audience: Senate Banking Committee
Members Stand Against $700B Bailout, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/
business/bernanke-paulson-face-tough-audience/86508/; see also Real Clear Politics, Paulson’s
Testimony to the House Services Committee, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/
2008/09/paulsons_testimony_to_the_hous.html.
48
See Glenn Greenwald, Growing Right-Wing Opposition to the Paulson Plan, SALON, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/09/22/paulson/. Connecticut Senator Christopher
Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, was disturbed by Paulson’s request to be free from
judicial review. Jason Linkins, Dirty Secret of the Bailout: Thirty-Two Words that None Dare Utter,
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/22/dirty-secret-of-thebailo_n_128294.html. Senator Dodd “proposed a bailout legislation of his own, which critically
call[ed] for ‘an oversight board that not only include[d] the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the
SEC, but congressionally appointed, non-governmental officials’ and . . . require[d] the President to
appoint an ‘independent inspector general to investigate the Treasury asset program.’” Id. In Senator
Dodd’s legislation, section eight was effectively stripped from the bill. Id. Senator Dodd’s proposal
would have given deference to Paulson as the acting Treasury Secretary; however, it would retain
judicial review: “‘Any determination by the Secretary with regard to any particular troubled asset
pursuant to this Act . . . shall not be set aside unless such determination is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law.’” Rod Smolla, Is Paulson’s
Bailout Bill Unconstitutional?, SLATE, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2200817/pagenum/all/.
Robert Kuttner of The American Prospect believed that the lack of judicial review in Paulson’s proposal
set his plan for intervention apart from others like it throughout history. Robert Kuttner, Paulson’s
Folly, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=paulsons
_folly.
The differences between this proposed bailout and the three closest historical
equivalents are immense. When the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the
1930s pumped a total of $35 billion into U.S. corporations and financial
institutions, there was close government supervision and quid pro quos at every
step of the way. Much of the time, the RFC became a preferred shareholder and
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bailing out the large financial firms over the average individual struggling through
the down economy.49 Many members of both parties doubted that the bailout,
even as large as it would be, would have any meaningful effect on the crisis. 50
Others were more concerned about to whom specifically they would be giving
such power and authority.51 The majority seemed to believe that Paulson was
indeed a well-qualified and trustworthy individual; 52 however, Paulson’s proposal

often appointed board members. The Home Owners Loan Corporation, which
eventually refinanced one in five mortgage loans, did not operate to bail out
banks but to save homeowners. And the Resolution Trust Corporation of the
1980s, created to mop up the damage of the first speculative mortgage meltdown,
the savings and loan collapse, did not pump in money to rescue bad investments;
it sorted out good assets from bad after the fact, and made sure to purge bad
executives as well as bad loans. And all three of these historic cases of public
recapitalization were done without suspending judicial review.
Id. Kuttner further criticized Paulson’s plan with the following claims:
It includes no oversight of his own closed-door operations. It merely gives
congressional blessing and funding to what he has already been doing, ad hoc.
He plans to retain Wall Street firms as advisers to decide just how to cut deals to
value and mop up Wall Street’s dubious paper. There are to be no limits on
executive compensation for the firms that get relief, and no equity share for the
government in exchange for this massive infusion of capital. Both Obama and
McCain have opposed the provision denying any judicial review of decisions
made by Paulson . . . .”
Id.
49
Kuttner reported:
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank said he would
want to add several features to the Paulson plan, including relief for homeowners,
a new stimulus package, and limits on CEO compensation. Said Frank, “It would
be a grave mistake to say that we’re going to buy up the bad debt that resulted
from the bad decisions of these [private sector] people and then allow them to get
millions of dollars on the way out. . . . It’s kind of hard to tell the average
American that we’re going to continue to have foreclosures that destabilize
neighborhoods and deprive cities of revenues they need, but we’re going to buy
up the [banks’] bad paper.”
Id.
50
Jennifer Parker of ABC News reported that Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, the most senior
member of the Banking Committee, was very hesitant about the plan’s success. Jennifer Parker, Bush
Administration Tells Congress to Act Quickly or Risk Recession, ABC NEWS Sept. 23, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PersonalFinance/Story?id=5865241&page=1. Senator Shelby stated,
“We have got to look at some alternatives.” Id. at 1. Shelby further stated, “I have long opposed
government bailouts for individuals and corporate America alike.” Id. at 2. He continued, “We have
been given no credible assurances that this plan will work. We could very well send $700 billion, or a
trillion, and not resolve the crisis.” Id. Representative Joe Barton of Texas disagreed with the proposal
of adding to the ever-increasing national debt: “I’m kind of an old- fashioned guy, and I think we ought
to pay for what we do as a government, but instead we’re talking about adding $1.5 trillion to our
national debt and forcing our children to pay the cost.” Kevin G. Hall & Dave Montgomery, Senate
Passes $810 Billion Economic Bailout, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
congress/story/53357.html.
51
See Ward, supra note 13.
52
The Senate unanimously confirmed Paulson’s appointment as Treasury Secretary in 2006. See
United States Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/history/secretaries/hm
paulson.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
Before coming to Treasury, Paulson was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of Goldman Sachs since the firm’s initial public offering in 1999. He joined
Goldman Sachs Chicago Office in 1974 and rose through the ranks holding
several positions including, Managing Partner of the firm’s Chicago office, Cohead of the firm’s investment Banking Division, President and Chief Operating
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would require Congress to place an enormous amount of trust also in an unknown
person, as it would grant power that would carry through to the Treasury Secretary
of the next administration.53
As significant as this opposition was, Paulson’s greatest critics quickly
appeared to be free-market conservative Republicans, as they were mortified by
the massive market intervention.54 Even with the full support of President Bush, it
appeared that Republicans were not going to support the plan. 55 Seeing that the
momentum was breaking down, Vice President called a special meeting with
House Republicans on September 25th to try to rally support for Paulson’s
proposal.56 The meeting was a failure, ending with only more contentions between

Officer, and Co-Senior partner. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Paulson was a
member of the White House Domestic Council, serving as Staff Assistant to the
President from 1972 to 1973, and as Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense at the Pentagon from 1970 to 1972.
Id.
53

Ward, supra note 13. Ward reported that,
The concern from some critics is not with Mr. Paulson, whom they view as
focused on fixing the economic crisis. Their worry is what happens after Mr.
Paulson leaves.
Mr. Paulson will not likely remain as Treasury secretary under the next
administration, even if he is kept on board for a few months during the transition,
as Democratic presidential nominee Sen. Barack Obama has said he might do.
That makes the next person to hold these extraordinary powers - which last for
two years - an unknown quantity.
“We’re going to hand these powers off to someone we don’t even know. And
that’s a wild card to me,” said Jim Rickards, who served a decade ago as general
counsel for Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose failure in the
late 1990s required a bailout by other banks and financial firms.
Id. at 3.
54
See Fitzgerald, supra note 24. A group of free-market Republicans known as the Republican
Study Committee agreed upon the “Ten Conservative Concerns With The Treasury Bailout,” an
alternative that “included suspending the capital gains tax, ending mark-to-market accounting rules and
privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” Id. For a copy of the Ten Conservative Concerns with the
Treasury Bailout, see TCCTB, http://www.house.gov/hensarling/rsc/doc/092308_10conservconcerns
bailout.pdf.
55
Several Republicans even began bringing plans of their own, some of which looked like
diametric opposites of Paulson’s strategy. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24. “[A] group of House
Republicans led by Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia circulated an alternate plan calling for Wall
Street firms to buy insurance on mortgage- backed securities while cutting taxes and relaxing
regulation.” Id. The Republicans plan was just one of many alternatives proposed by political and
economic leaders. Senator Hillary Clinton proposed the Home Owner Loan Corporation (HOLC), a
plan that would focus on rebuilding the economy by allowing homeowner’s to avoid foreclosure as had
been done during the 1930’s Great Depression. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Let’s Keep People in their
Homes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12223
0767702474045.html. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary
Fund, recommended a similar approach to Paulson’s in focusing upon “liquidity provision; purchase of
distressed assets; and capital injections into financial institutions.” Dominique Strauss-Kahn, A
Systematic Crisis Demands Systematic Solutions, Sept. 22, 2008, at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/vc/2008/092208.htm. Financial investment leader Warren Buffet agreed to an extent with Paulson’s
bailout plan; however, he urged that the Federal Government must buy the “troubled assets” of financial
institutions at the market price rather than Paulson’s proposed “hold-to-maturity” as the maturity price
was unrealistically favorable to banks. Henry Blodget, Even Warren Buffet Agrees: Bernanke Bailout
Price Plan a Joke, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2008, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henryblodget/even-warren-buffett-agree_b_128919.html.
56
Fitzgerald, supra note 24.
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Republicans.57
Another meeting was held later on September 25th between Congressional
leaders at the White House to discuss the status of Paulson’s proposal.58 Staff
members and aides of the representatives reported that when House minority
leader John Boehner stated that “House Republicans were not on board . . . [t]he
meeting erupted in shouting.”59 It was reported that as:
[T]he meeting broke up and participants stormed out, Paulson followed
[Democratic Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney Frank]
and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Paulson, pleading with Pelosi to keep the deal
alive in spite of the partisanship, got down on one knee and begged her to push
on . . . .60
With tensions high within both parties, House Democrats put the proposal to
a vote as an amendment to HR 3997 on September 29th. 61 Several Paulson
supporters were optimistic, including President Bush, but as a large number of
‘no’ votes began coming in, it was apparent that the amendment would fail. 62 Both
Democratic and Republican leaders continued to plead with party members to pass
the plan, as the vote was held open for forty minutes, “nearly triple the usual
[fifteen] minutes” allotted for voting.63 “Pelosi could be seen on the floor pleading
with fellow Democrats Bennie Thompson and Jesse Jackson Jr. to change their
‘no’ votes to ‘yes.’ Thompson repeatedly shook his head ‘no’ at the speaker.
When the gavel went down, the bill fell [twelve] votes short.”64 The Dow Jones
Industrial Average fell nearly 500 points during the vote alone, finally closing the
day down 777 points.65
As financial markets continued to fall, the Senate took Paulson’s proposal to
vote on October 1st as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”) of
2008, an amendment to HR 1424.66 The Senate passed the bill with overwhelming
approval seventy-four to twenty-five.67 Many members of the Senate believed that
the bill would pass on House vote as two “sweeteners” were added to motivate
votes from numerous constituencies: “a tax cut and extended federal protection for
57
Id. Fitzgerald reported that “Indiana Republican Mike Pence said it was ‘very evident’ after the
meeting that ‘there is a growing discontent among Republicans.’’’ Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Fitzgerald, supra note 24.
62
Id.
Congressman Michael Conaway, a Texas Republican, waited to see where the
vote was going as he tried to decide. An accountant by training, he said he
understood the risks posed by securities backed by foreclosed mortgages, yet still
opposed bailing out those responsible for them. One of the last to vote, he said he
stood in front of the machine with a hand on both the “yes” and “no” buttons and
paused. After a moment, he pressed “no.”
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Fitzgerald, supra note 24.
67
Ron Haruni, U.S. Senate Passes Economic Bailout Bill, WALL STREET PIT, Oct. 1, 2008,
available at http://wallstreetpit.com/2008/10/senate-passes-economic-bailout-bill/.
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bank deposits . . . .”68 Furthermore, numerous measures of oversight had been
added to the original proposal in addition to striking the ‘no review’ clause.69 The
bill returned to the House for a vote on October 3rd and passed 263-171,
undoubtedly to Paulson’s great relief.70 After two weeks of excruciating
negotiations, Paulson’s once clear-cut two and a half page proposal now stood as
the EESA,71 a “450 page [statute,] laden with tax breaks and other measures
unrelated to the crisis.”72 Even so, the essence of Paulson’s $700 billion capped
bailout proposal was now law. 73
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EESA AND THE POWER THAT WAS
AUTHORIZED TO TREASURY SECRETARY HENRY PAULSON
The amendment to HR 1424 was the 450-page manifestation of the two
weeks of hard political negotiations that followed Paulson’s initial bailout
proposal. Paulson’s two and a half page proposal, concise and pure in its purpose
to address the financial and economic crises through a broad bailout, became the
bulletin board on which hundreds of political add-ons were pinned. However, as
convoluted as it was, still lying beneath the blanket of both conservative and liberal
flavored add-ons was the beating heart of a monumental $700 billion bailout plan
to be managed by Paulson. Thus, underneath the political mess and chains of
oversight was a grant of extreme power. As many have argued, the EESA may
have made Henry Paulson not only the most powerful Treasury Secretary to date,
but also perhaps one of the most power political officers in American history.

68
Fitzgerald, supra note 24. Many considered the new bill to have actually been an $810 billion
bailout as another $110 billion in tax breaks was further provided for businesses and individuals. See
Hall, supra note 50.
69
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
The White House said layers of oversight have been added in the . . . two weeks
of negotiations to ensure transparency and integrity in the process. [White House
spokesman Tony Fratto stated that,] “[t]he government has nuclear programs that
don’t have as much oversight, reporting and surveillance . . . [Whereas] [t]he bill
will give the Treasury secretary ‘a lot of decision-making authority,” there will
be an “unprecedented amount of oversight and supervision . . .
Ward, supra note 13.
70
See Dave Burdick, House Bailout Bill Friday Vote: YEA – 263, NAY – 171, HUFFINGTON POST,
Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/02/house-bailout-vote-encore_n_131222.html.
71
See Draft Proposal, supra note 8.
72
Fitzgerald, supra note 24.
73
Stephen S. Kudenholdt, Summary and Analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Order No.
14108, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
305 (Practising Law Institute, 2008).
The initial plan that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson submitted to Congress
was short and simple. It gave Secretary Paulson $700 billion and the authority to
use all of the tools of the capital markets to remove distressed assets from
institutional balance sheets and to manage, workout, finance, repackage and sell
those assets, without the constraints of mark-to-market accounting, capital
charges, credit concerns or other impediments to private institutions. Although
Congress greatly expanded the final bill, with a few significant exceptions, the
Secretary has retained the broad authority that he requested.
Id.
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The general purpose of the entire HR 1424 amendment was:
To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure
certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and
preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting
taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide
incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain expiring
provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other purposes.74

As the EESA was the amendment’s most powerful tool to accomplish this
general purpose, the Act had a much more specific purpose:
(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury
can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States;
and
(2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a manner that—
(A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life
savings;
(B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth;
(C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States; and
(D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such authority. 75

In essence, Congress acted to: (1) equip the Treasury Secretary with broad
and powerful tools (such as the $700 billion capped bailout and authority to further
insure/guaranty other assets) in order to restabilize the United States financial
system; and (2) guide the use of such powers for the mutual benefit of businesses
and individual taxpayers alike through oversight and public accountability.
A. Paulson’s Authority under the EESA
The main ‘authority and facility’ given to Paulson under the EESA was the
power to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) as a vehicle for a
$700 billion capped bailout plan. 76 Under the TARP, Paulson could establish the
“Office of Financial Stability”77 in order “to purchase, and to make and fund

74

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).

75
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, § 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766
(2008).
76
Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 309-10.
The centerpiece of the Program is the Secretary’s ability to purchase troubled
assets from ailing financial institutions in an attempt to stem the write-downs and
losses being taken by such institutions. By establishing ‘market’ prices for
troubled assets and providing liquidity to the market, the Program also seeks to
encourage private participants to begin purchasing mortgage related and other
structured products as well.
Id.
77
Although Paulson is given the authority to manage the overall TARP, the EESA required that
the Office of Financial Stability “be headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, appointed by the
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commitments to purchase, troubled assets78 from any financial institution, on such
terms and conditions as are determined by the [Treasury] Secretary, and in
accordance with [other provisions of the EESA] and the policies and procedures
developed and published by the Secretary.”79 Paulson’s authority under TARP
allowed him to immediately purchase $250 billion of troubled assets to be held
outstanding without any further authorization from Congress. 80 Paulson could then
raise the limit of outstanding troubled assets to $350 billion upon the President
submitting “a written certification” to Congress indicating “that the Secretary
needs to exercise [such] authority.”81 The final step of authorized power allowed
Paulson to double the limit of outstanding troubled assets owned by the federal
government to $700 billion with another “written report” submitted to Congress by
the President.82
Upon establishing the TARP, Paulson was additionally authorized to
guaranty and insure other troubled assets (and set the premiums for such
guarantees) with only minor limitations. 83 Thus, within only the first few pages of
the EESA, Congress anointed Paulson with the power to directly intervene in the
financial market to the extent of purchasing $700 billion of financially “troubled”
assets (and indeed to have a greater effect than $700 billion as Paulson could also
insure/guaranty even more assets).
Paulson’s intervention power became even greater when he was given broad
authority to manage these programs and the assets they purchased. First, as to
management of the programs themselves, EESA section 101(c) granted Paulson
the primary execution authority to take actions that he deemed were “necessary to
carry out the authorities” in the EESA.84 Section 101(c) went on to provide a brief,
yet substantial, list of just a few of these powers of execution.85 Paulson had the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2008).
78
“Troubled assets” were considered to be any “residential or commercial mortgages and any
securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each
case was originated or issued on or before March 14, 2008, the purchase of which the Secretary
determines promotes financial market stability . . .” § 3(9)(A), 122 Stat. at 3767. Additionally, a
“troubled asset” could be “any other financial instrument that the Secretary, after consultation with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which
is necessary to promote financial market stability . . .” § 3(9)(B), 122 Stat. at 3767. Kudenholdt notes
that although section 3(9)(A) focused on a particular group of securities, section 3(9)(B) allowed
Paulson to include many other types of financial assets in the Program after consultation with the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and notice to Congress. Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 308.
79
Emergency Econ. Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat.
3765, 3767 (2008) (emphasis added).
80
§ 115(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3780.
81
§ 115(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 3780.
82
§ 115(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3780. The “written report” required more than just Presidential
certification. The report was required to “[d]etail the plan of the Secretary to exercise the authority.”
Id. The power to raise the outstanding troubled asset limit to $700 billion does not actually become
effective until fifteen days after the President submits the written report, so long as a joint resolution
opposed to the report is not filed within this time period. Id.
83
§102(a)(1)-(2), 122 Stat. at 3768-69.
84
§ 101(c), 122 Stat. at 3768.
85
EESA section 101(c)’s list of powers to carry the bailout into effect was not a limitation on any
other power Paulson might deem necessary. “The Secretary is authorized to take such actions as the
Secretary deems necessary to carry out the authorities in this Act, including, without limitation, the
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direct authority to hire and manage employees that would administer the TARP. 86
In purchasing or guarantying troubled assets, Paulson had the authority to enter
into contracts on behalf of the Federal Government and to further designate
“financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government.”87
In the spirit of “[minimizing] cost to taxpayers” for the management of the
extensive amount of assets to be held by the TARP, Congress further authorized
Paulson the “flexibility” to create financial agents of his own to “purchase, hold,
and sell troubled assets and issue obligations.”88 Importantly, Congress did not
restrict the number or type of financial “vehicles” that Paulson could establish.89
Finally, in order to make sure that Paulson’s executive powers were truly
complete, Congress then broadly authorized Paulson to issue “such regulations and
other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the
authorities or purposes of” the EESA.90
Second, in addition to such administrative authority over the program itself,
Paulson was further given broad powers to manage the hundreds of billions of
dollars worth of troubled assets that were purchased through the EESA’s
application. EESA section 106(b) stated that Paulson “. . . shall have authority to
manage troubled assets purchased under this Act, including revenues and portfolio
risks therefrom.”91 Additionally, section 106(a) stated that Paulson may “. . . at
any time, exercise any rights received in connection with troubled assets purchased
under this Act.”92 Paulson was essentially given the complete authoritative control
over managing the funds acquired so that he could sell or reinvest such funds to
maximize return on the taxpayer’s investment.93
Whereas Paulson was given other powers throughout the EESA, the most
consequential were these powers to execute and manage the likely $700 billion
following . . .” Id. (emphasis added). As the Kudenholdt observes, “[o]nce purchased, troubled assets
may be managed, financed and sold as the Secretary sees fit.” Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 307.
86
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(c)(1), 122 Stat.
3765, 3768 (2008).
87
§§ 101(c)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3768.
88
§ 101(c)(4), 122 Stat. at 3768.
89
Paulson’s freedom to establish such financial “vehicles” was further broadened by the Federal
Government’s further freedom from tax constraint and liability. As Kudenholdt notes,
[Paulson] will not have to consider the tax, limitation of liability and bankruptcy
issues that private institutions must consider when forming entities to hold assets.
As a result, the form of vehicle used will likely relate more to convenience,
flexibility and suitability for the assets being held and the types of obligations
that may be issued. In some of the recent transactions with troubled financial
institutions, the Federal Reserve Bank has utilized limited liability companies
(where private parties shared an interest in the acquired assets) and pass-through
trusts.
Kudenholdt, supra note 73, at 315.
90
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A, tit. I, § 101(c)(5), 122 Stat.
3765, 3768 (2008).
91
§ 106(b), 122 Stat. at 3773.
92
§ 106(a), 122 Stat. at 3773 (emphasis added).
93
See § 106(c), 122 Stat. at 3773 (“The Secretary may, at any time, upon terms and conditions and
at a price determined by the Secretary, sell, or enter into securities loans, repurchase transactions, or
other financial transactions in regard to, any troubled asset purchased under this Act.”); § 113(a)(2), 122
Stat. at 3778 (“. . . the Secretary shall hold the assets to maturity or for resale for and until such time as
the Secretary determines that the market is optimal for selling such assets . . .”)
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bailout of troubled institutions in the United States financial market. However, as
part two of the EESA purpose expressed, these powers were given to Paulson with
strong guidance and oversight. As members of Congress went to great length to
guide and hedge the broad powers given to Paulson, it is important to view
Paulson’s authority over the bailout plan in the context of the EESA’s oversight
provisions.
B. Congressional Guidance of Paulson’s Authority
Congress understood that Paulson needed broad and flexible powers in order
for the bailout to be most effective and efficient in addressing the financial crisis.
Even so, Congress did not want to hand over the keys to the $700 billion vault
without at least giving Paulson some small bit of advice on how to spend it. Like
the father who cannot help but give his teenager one last lecture of guidance before
handing over the keys to the car, Congress delivered section 103’s
“considerations” for Paulson to review before ‘punching’ the brand new bailout
vehicle’s gas pedal.
Congress reminded Paulson to protect taxpayer interests in seeking
maximum return to seek stability for financial markets and prevent further
disturbance, “to help families keep their homes,” to remember the towns and
counties that have been affected, and to protect American “jobs, savings, and
retirement security.”94 Congress further urged Paulson to think in the long-term
when investing, to ensure that the TARP would not discriminate against certain
financial institutions, to remember smaller institutions that serve low to moderateincome areas, and to consider the “utility of purchasing other real estate owned and
instruments backed by mortgages on multifamily properties . . .”95
C. Oversight of Paulson’s Authority
Of course, Congress had not left $700 billion in Paulson’s hands on guidance
alone. For as much as Congress had granted immense power to Paulson in the
EESA, it also set up several substantial measures of disclosure, 96 limitation,97
94

See §§ 103(1)-(3), (7), (9), 122 Stat. at 3770.
See §§ 103(4)-(6), (9), 122 Stat. at 3770. Congress further provided Paulson with outside
guidance under section 101(b) by requiring him to “consult with the [Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System], [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation], Comptroller of the Currency, Director of
the Office of Thrift Supervision, Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development” when exercising his authority under the EESA. §
101(b), 1222 Stat. at 3768.
96
Congress required Paulson to disclose more specifics about how the program would work
through publishing the “program guidelines.” § 101(d), 122 Stat. 3768. Paulson’s “program guidelines”
had to disclose: (1) mechanisms for purchasing troubled assets; (2) methods for pricing and valuing
troubled assets; (3) procedures for selecting asset managers; and (4) criteria for identifying troubled
assets for purchase. Id.
97
One of the most important measures of limitation upon Paulson’s power was duration. § 120(a),
122 Stat. at 3788. Section 120(a) stated that all of the “authorities provided [to Paulson] under sections
101(a), excluding section 101(a)(3), and 102 shall terminate on December 31, 2009.” Id. Either
Paulson or the next Treasury Secretary could have however extended such authority nearly another year
by submitting a written certification for extension to Congress. § 120(b), 122 Stat. at 3788 (which
allowed for an extension to last no later than two “years from the date of enactment of [the EESA]”).
The subsequently appointed Secretary Tim Geithner was required to include in such a certification a
95
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accountability,98 and oversight to check Paulson’s exercise of such power. The
two major instruments of oversight used by Congress were oversight boards. The
first of these boards was the Financial Stability Oversight Board (“FSOB”)
established by EESA section 104. 99 The FSOB’s primary purposes included
reviewing the exercise of power taken by Paulson under the TARP, making
recommendations to Paulson concerning future exercises of power, and reporting
“any suspected fraud, misrepresentation, or malfeasance to the Special Inspector
General for the [TARP] or the Attorney General of the United States.”100 The
FSOB also retained the authority to “ensure” that Paulson’s continuing policies for
the TARP were: (1) congruent with the Congress’ stated purposes for the EESA;
(2) “in the economic interests of the United States;” and (3) “consistent with
protecting taxpayers.”101 Additionally, the FSOB had the option of creating a
Credit Review Committee to further evaluate Paulson’s exercise of power in
purchasing troubled assets.102
The second oversight board instituted by the EESA was the Congressional
Oversight Panel (“COP”)103 established by section 125.104 The duty of the COP
was to continually “review the current state of the financial markets and the
regulatory system” and submit several reports105 to Congress on its findings. 106

“justification of why the extension is necessary to assist American families and stabilize financial
markets, as well as the expected cost to the taxpayers for such an extension.” Id.
98
In addition to numerous measures of oversight, Paulson was required to further submit several of
his own reports to Congress concerning the exercise of his newly granted authority under the bailout
plan. First, Paulson was required to submit an extensive report to various Congressional committees
every thirty days which includes: (1) an overview of the actions he has taken in connection with his
EESA authority; (2) “obligations and expenditures” of section 118 funding since the last report with an
estimated projection for the next period; and (3) a “detailed financial statement” that meticulously
discloses the details of all financial actions taken by Paulson under his EESA authority. § 105(a), 122
Stat. at 3771-72. Paulson was required to further submit a “Tranche” report to Congress every time the
TARP breached a new $50 billion plateau of purchased assets. § 105(b), 122 Stat. at 3772. Along with
all of this, Paulson was required to provide a justification with every report for the prices the TARP was
paying. Id. Paulson was also required to submit a “regulatory modernization report” to Congress by
April 30, 2009. §105(c), 122 Stat. at 3772. This report was required to analyze “the current state of the
regulatory system and its effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial markets, including
the over-the-counter swaps market and government-sponsored enterprises, and providing
recommendations for improvement . . .” Id at 3772-73.
99
§ 104(a), 122 Stat. at 3770. The FSOB is a five member board comprised of the: (1) Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;(2) Treasury Secretary; (3) Director of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency; (4) Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission; and (5)
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. § 104(b), 122 Stat. at 3771.
100
§ 104(a), 122 Stat. at 3770.
101
§ 104(e), 122 Stat. at 3771.
102
§ 104(f), 122 Stat. at 3771.
103
The COP is a five member board comprised of : (1) one member appointed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives; (2) one member appointed by the minority leader of the House of
Representatives; (3) one member appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; (4) one member
appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; and (5) one member appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate, “after consultation with the minority
leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.” § 125(c)(1), 122 Stat. at
3792.
104
§ 125, 122 Stat. at 3791-92.
105
The COP was required to provide “general reports” to Congress every thirty days pertaining to
the use, impact, and effectiveness of Paulson’s power under the EESA. §125(b)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at
3791. The COP was further required to submit a “special report on regulatory reform” to Congress by
no later than January 20, 2009:
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The COP was given several powers in order to fulfill its duty as the panel could:
(1) hold hearings with the authority to receive evidence and sworn testimony; (2)
enlist agents; and (3) obtain direct information from any department or agency of
the United States.107
In addition to these two oversight boards, Congress also anointed two
governmental officials with the authorization to personally oversee how Paulson
exercised his powers under the EESA. The first of these officials was the
Comptroller General of the United States. EESA section 116(a) authorized the
Comptroller General to conduct “ongoing oversight” of literally every component
of Paulson’s execution of the TARP.108 The Comptroller General could
investigate all “activities and performance of the TARP and of any agents and
representatives of the TARP . . . including vehicles established by the
Secretary.”109 In addition to this general oversight power, the Comptroller General
could further “audit the programs, activities, receipts, expenditures, and financial
transactions of the TARP and any agents and representatives of the TARP . . .
including vehicles established by the Secretary.”110 Congress ordered Paulson to
do much more than just submit to such extensive oversight. EESA section 116
required Paulson to allow constant Comptroller “presence,” as Paulson had to
provide the Comptroller General sufficient “space and facilities” within the
Treasury Department to conduct the oversight. 111 If that weren’t enough, Congress
further ordered the Treasury Department to pay the bill of its own oversight as
EESA section 116(a)(2)(C) stated that “[t]he Treasury shall reimburse the
Government Accountability Office for the full cost of any such oversight activities
as billed therefor by the Comptroller General.”112

[A]nalyzing the current state of the regulatory system and its effectiveness at
overseeing the participants in the financial system and protecting consumers, and
providing recommendations for improvement, including recommendations
regarding whether any participants in the financial markets that are currently
outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory system, the
rationale underlying such recommendation, and whether there are any gaps in
existing consumer protections.
§ 125(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3792.
106
§ 125(b), 122 Stat. at 3791-92.
107
§ 125(e), 122 Stat. at 3793.
108
§ 116(a), 122 Stat. at 3783.
109
Id. Similar to the COP, the Comptroller General was required to continually investigate
whether Paulson’s performance under the TARP met the purposes of the EESA in advancing
foreclosure mitigation, cost reduction, stability in financial markets, and protection of taxpayers. §
116(a)(1)(A), 122 Stat. at 3783. The Comptroller General was to evaluate “[t]he financial condition
and internal controls of the TARP” along with the characteristics of its purchases, obligations, and
disposition of assets. § 116(a)(1)(B)-(D), 122 Stat. at 3784. Additionally, the Comptroller General was
required to monitor the TARP’s operations efficiency, compliance with all other laws, efforts in
avoiding conflicts of interest among agents and representatives, and “efficacy of contracting procedures
pursuant to section 107(b).” § 116(a)(1)(E)-(H), 122 Stat. at 3784. While “overseeing” the TARP, the
Comptroller General was given complete access to all TARP related information. § 116(a)(2)(B), 122
Stat. at 3784.
110
§ 116(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3785. Whereas the Comptroller General had the general power to audit
upon discretion, he or she was required to conduct at least one annual audit per year. § 116(b)(1), 122
Stat. at 3785. The Comptroller General’s annual audit required the TARP to “prepare and issue to the
appropriate committees of Congress and the public audited financial statements.” Id.
111
§ 116(a)(2)(A), 122 Stat. at 3784.
112
§ 116(a)(2)(C), 122 Stat. at 3785.
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The Comptroller General was not the only official keeping a personal eye
upon Paulson’s exercise of power in the TARP. Congress concurrently established
the “Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program.”113 The Inspector General had the authority to investigate and audit the
“purchase, management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the Treasury under
any program established by the Secretary under section 101, and the management
by the Secretary of any program established under section 102 . . .”114 The
Inspector General could be involved in the oversight of every troubled asset
Paulson purchased under the bailout plan, as among the articles of information the
Inspector General was required to report to Congress 115 was “an explanation of the
reasons the Secretary deemed it necessary to purchase each such troubled asset.”116
Similar to the Comptroller General, Congress did not stop at just requiring Paulson
to submit to the official’s oversight. EESA section 121(g) required Paulson to
allocate $50 million of the funding set aside for his use under EESA section 118 to
provide funding for the Inspector General to fulfill the oversight duties. 117
In addition to these major instruments of oversight, Congress also hedged
Paulson’s exercise of power by installing a measure of judicial review in EESA
section 119, effectively scrapping the “no review” clause from Paulson’s
proposal.118 EESA section 119(a)(1) subjected Paulson’s exercise of power to the
general judicial review provisions provided in “chapter seven of title 5 [of the]
United States Code” and directed the adjudicator to find and set aside any of
Paulson’s actions “. . . that are found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not in accordance with law.”119 Even though this highly sought-after
judicial review existed in Congress’ final grant of power to Paulson, there was
significant debate over whether it is a true check on his authority as EESA section
119 also provided substantial limitations on the types of parties that can bring
suit120 and more importantly upon the equitable relief that may be granted.121
113

§ 121(a), 122 Stat. at 3788.
§ 121(c), 122 Stat. at 3788-89 (emphasis added).
115
The Inspector General was required to collect and summarize information such as the complete
listings of every purchased troubled asset, the names of each financial institution that sold the assets, a
detailed biography of every “person or entity hired to manage such troubled assets,” and a list of all
insurance contracts that have been issued by Paulson under section 102. §§ 121(c)(1)(B), (D)-(E), (G),
122 Stat. at 3788-89. The Inspector General was also required to keep a current estimate of the “total
amount of troubled assets purchased” by any section 101 program. § 121(c)(1)(F), 122 Stat. at 3789.
The Inspector General is broadly equipped to acquire such information by sections 121(c)(2), 121(d),
and 121(e).
116
§ 121(c)(1)(C), 122 Stat. at 3789 (emphasis added).
117
§ 121(g), 122 Stat. at 3790.
118
See Draft Proposal, supra note 8.
119
§ 119(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3787.
120
Section 119(a)(3)’s “limitations on actions by participating companies” provided that “[n]o
action or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any person that divests its assets with respect
to its participation in a program under” under the EESA. The only exception to this limitation was if
Paulson were to waive the limitation expressly in a contract with the company or individual. §
119(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3787.
121
The major limitation on equitable relief against Paulson was EESA section 119(a)(2)(A): “. . .
no injunction or other form of equitable relief shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant
to section 101, 102, 106, and 109, other than to remedy a violation of the Constitution.” David Zaring,
blogger for the Conglomerate, believed that this limitation effectively canceled out the judicial review.
See David Zaring, Judicial Review in the Bailout Bill, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.theconglomerate.org/
114
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D. Impact of Paulson’s Bailout Authority
Given that the 2008 crisis was considered by many to have had “an
unprecedented amount of uncertainty as to the extent of either its causes or
effects,” the impact (or non-impact) of Paulson’s bailout authority will not truly be
ascertainable for quite some time.122
It may well be that the $700 billion bailout will calm the financial markets, be
sufficient to prevent further collapses among insurers, banks and investment
houses, and perhaps even prove to be far less costly to taxpayers than its $700
billion price tag when assets acquired by the federal government . . . at steep
discounts are later sold at a profit. Such a ‘soft landing’ is far from certain,
however. The bailout seeks to stabilize the financial and credit markets primarily by
purchasing mortgage-backed securities, the worth of which is highly suspect.123

E. Summary and Conclusion of Paulson’s Authority
The EESA granted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson tremendous authority
to establish, execute, and manage a $700 billion capped bailout of the United
States financial system. His power was not only defined simply by the magnitude
of its reach, but also by the enormity of the microscope that Congress continually
hovered above him through the EESA’s extensive oversight. All of this
considered, there is no doubt that Paulson will be remembered as a historically
powerful government official.
Paulson was given great power to address a dire financial crisis, but in
context, was he really the most powerful Treasury Secretary in United States
history? Was the scope of the authority given to Paulson under the EESA really an
“unprecedented” leap by Congress? The next section of this article will begin to
show that the answer to these questions is no, as the section will define the genesis
of a Congressional trend to magnify Treasury Secretary authority in times of
financial crisis by examining the pattern’s first and truly most powerful proponent,
Alexander Hamilton.
IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TREND TO MAGNIFY

2008/10/judicial-review.html. Zaring stated that “it looks a bit like the bill provides for [arbitrary and
capricious review] in one section, and then takes it away, by taking away equitable relief, in the other
section.” Id. Zaring’s main contention was that the arbitrary and capricious review granted by EESA
section 119(a) was itself considered to be an equitable relief by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Doe v.
Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 619 n.1 (2004) (“referring to the ‘the general provisions for equitable relief within
the Administrative Procedure Act’ and citing a section of the same Title 5, Chapter 7 referenced in the
bailout bill’s judicial review provisions”)). Zaring did not believe that “someone who thought that . . .
Paulson underpaid for a particular mortgage backed security [could] sue . . .” under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Id. Zaring conceded however that some sort of declaratory judgment might be
available to such a plaintiff in asserting that Paulson had made a sale that was plainly inconsistent with
the EESA. Id. Either way, Zaring pointed out that under Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), the
Treasury Department could “use its broad powers to set up a mandatory administrative appeals process,
which . . . would keep plaintiffs out of the courts until they had exhausted their administrative remedies,
and which would give the courts an adjudicated process to look at (and, hopefully for Treasury, rubber
stamp).” Id.
122
Alan C. Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Government Posed by the Housing
and Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 259, 271 (2009) (emphasis added).
123
Id. at 271-72.
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TREASURY SECRETARY AUTHORITY IN THE MIDST OF CRISIS:
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1789-1795)
A. The Public Credit Crisis
The infant United States presented newly elected President George
Washington with a multitude of challenges upon his taking office in the spring of
1789, none more complex and critical to the future of the Union then the state of
the nation’s finances. Fighting the War of Independence against England had
caused the Continental Congress to retain debt from “. . . more creditors than any
other government in the world.”124 The vast majority of the Revolutionary War
debt, or as political leaders called it “the price of liberty,” had not yet been “settled
since independence due to the ‘embarrassment of a defective constitution” under
the Confederation.125 By 1789 the United States’ foreign debt totaled over $10
million (with $1.6 million more in arrears of interest). 126 The nation’s domestic
debt, largely comprised of war certificates and bonds issued to former Continental
soldiers and suppliers, amounted to more than $40 million with accrued interest. 127
All in all, the newly formed federal government was in a $50 million hole; a virtual
anvil around the neck of its hopeful Constitution.
Adding to the financial strain of the nation was the fact that the individual
states also owed both domestic and foreign investors an aggregated $25 million, 128
which only a few states had made significant progress in paying. 129 The size of the
national and state debts was only the beginning of the problem however, as the
organization and subsequent management of the domestic debt could be described
as nothing short of chaotic.130 Furthermore, faith in the fledgling United States

124
JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 230
(Transaction Publishers 2004) (1959).
125
MARIE B. HECHT, ODD DESTINY: THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 180 (1982).
126
MILLER, supra note 124, at 230.
127
Id. See also MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1970).
The total owed to individuals amounted to more than 40 million dollars. Of
which about one-third was accrued interest. Many of the certificates had
originally been issued to pay soldiers and officers of the army; others had been
given to farmers and merchants by commissary officers. Many of the bonds had
been purchased by patriotic investors who had later been obliged to sell them at a
loss; some of the securities, like some certificates and warrants, had changed
hands several times.
Id.
128
JACOB ERNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (1982).
129
“Massachusetts and South Carolina had large unpaid obligations on the war account; North
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Georgia had paid off most of their war debts; the other states had less
at stake.” MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.
130
See MILLER, supra note 124, at 230.
The domestic debt consisted of a chaos of virtually worthless paper money; loanoffice certificates; IOU’s signed by the Quartermaster commissary generals;
lottery prizes (the government had conducted lotteries but had been unable to pay
the winners in cash); certificates given to soldiers and officers in lieu of pay;
indents (paper certificates representing interest debt). Hardly a means of going
into debt known to the governments of the eighteenth century had been omitted
by the Continental Congress . . .
Id.
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financial system was low and diminishing, significantly compounding the problem
of borrowing and repayment. 131
Many historians believe that the success of Washington’s administration, and
indeed the sustained future of the whole nation, rested upon how Washington
addressed the nation’s mounting financial crisis.132 Washington turned to Robert
Morris, former Superintendent of Finance under the Confederation, for guidance in
asking, “[w]hat are we to do with this heavy debt?”133 Morris’ only answer for the
President was a referral: “[t]here is but one man in the United States who can tell
you; that is Alexander Hamilton.”134 Washington appointed Hamilton, his longtime friend and confidant,135 to be the first Treasury Secretary of the United States
on September 11, 1789. 136 Hamilton’s exercise of power in addressing the postRevolutionary financial crisis and further creating the initial American financial
system has caused many to consider him to be the most influential, powerful, and
indeed controversial Treasury Secretary in United States history.137
The sheer size and nature of the national debt forced Hamilton to face a
critical market intervention dilemma from the outset of his service. Whereas the
majority agreed that all foreign debt should be repaid, many wanted Hamilton to
consider an arbitrary cancellation of the domestic debt altogether.138 In the face of
national bankruptcy, the argument for canceling the domestic debt was supported
131
The United States’ revenue from taxation failed to even meet the interest of the government’s
obligations. Id. at 231. Hamilton would later define the problem as a rather vicious cycle. Id. at 230.
Hamilton had always contended that the government could not endure without
credit ‘commensurate with the utmost extent of the lending faculties of the
community’; but credit could not be established until provision had been made
for the existing debt. Little could be done toward disposing of the existing debt,
however, until the government had regained its ability to borrow. Truly the
finances of the United States were a dilemma wrapped in a paradox.
Id.
132
Cooke believed that “[t]he success of Washington’s administration largely hinged on its
adoption of fiscal policies that would revive confidence in the fledgling nation, both at home and abroad
. . .” COOKE, supra note 128, at 73. Miller further expressed that “[t]he success of the Constitution and
the very existence of the republic depended upon the skill with which the financial obligations of the
government were handled.” MILLER, supra note 124, at 230.
133
HECHT, supra note 125, at 177.
134
Id.
135
Hamilton served as Washington’s “chief of staff” and “principal and most confidential aide,”
during the Revolutionary War. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 90, 91 (2004). Washington
considered Hamilton to be like a surrogate son during their time in the war, even referring to him as
“my boy.” Id. at 87.
136
HECHT, supra note 125, at 177. The Senate would go on to confirm Hamilton as the Treasury
Secretary later that same day. Id.
137
See generally RICHARD B. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE FOUNDING OF A NATION
285 (1957). As to the founding of the initial American financial system:
Hamilton came into Washington’s cabinet with a seven-point program: (1) the
restoration of public credit; (2) a sound system of taxation; (3) a national bank;
(4) a sound currency; (5) the promotion of commerce; (6) the encouragement of
manufactures; and (7) a liberal immigration policy. In his public papers he made
it clear that the carrying out of this program was not to be at the expense of
agriculture, but would result in the building of a balanced economy which would
benefit all economic groups. His program was brilliantly presented to the nation
in a series of bold and masterful reports.
Id.
138
MILLER, supra note 124, at 231.
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both by a basic call for national self-preservation and a rationale that the United
States had in a sense already fulfilled a greater obligation to creditors in providing
them with liberty through the defeat of England. 139 Whereas Hamilton held that
the federal government did have the power to cancel debt, 140 he concluded that it
would not be “just” to do so in this case as he sincerely believed that the United
States could fulfill its debt obligations upon reform of policy. 141
Even though Hamilton had refused such an extreme measure, market
intervention was still on his mind. In October of 1789, only weeks after
Hamilton’s appointment, Congress requested that Hamilton submit a proposal to
address the public credit crisis.142 Hamilton responded two months later with his
historic First Report on the Public Credit.143 Similar to Paulson, Hamilton
submitted a three-part proposal144 involving measures of far-reaching market
intervention that required Congress to give Hamilton and the Treasury Department
a tremendous amount of power. 145 First, Hamilton proposed that the Treasury
Department, acting on behalf of the President, be authorized to borrow money and
use excess tax revenue as necessary to pay down the entirety of the foreign debt
owed to France, Holland, and Spain over the next fifteen years. 146 This was the
least controversial part of Hamilton’s plan as it was generally agreed that the
priority for the United States was to protect its financial reputation with foreign
nations.147
Second, Hamilton proposed that the federal government address the domestic
debt by allowing the Treasury Department to offer the speculators which held the
controversial war bonds and certificates148 a redemption of their securities in
139

Id.
“The highest law of the state, [Hamilton] admitted, was self-preservation; when its existence
was at stake, a government could alter the terms of contracts, discriminate between various groups of
creditors and declare its obligations null and void.” Id.
141
Id. Hamilton expressed this belief in stating that if he were to “establish that a government may
decline a provision for its debts, though able to make it . . . and you overthrow all public morality . . .
You have anarchy, despotism, or what you please, but you have no just or regular government.” Id.
142
Id. at 231-32.
143
MYERS, supra note 127, at 60.
144
In sum, Hamilton’s report would seek to explain how “the debt could be paid, to whom it
should be paid and what was to be done with the state debts dating from the Revolutionary War.”
MILLER, supra note 124, at 232.
145
MYERS, supra note 127, at 60-62.
146
Id. at 60-61.
147
Id. at 61.
148
The majority of men who had been originally “paid” with the war certificates were veteran
soldiers and suppliers of the Revolutionary War. See generally MILLER, supra note 124, at 232-34.
These veterans, and often their widows or orphans, were met with hard times after the war. Id. Many
of them were forced by their circumstances to sell the war securities to speculators “often at a fraction
their nominal value . . .” Id. at 232. Due to this sad situation, a widespread “equity” debate spread
throughout Congress pertaining to who should be justly paid for the outstanding war certificates and
bonds. Congressman Aedanus Burke “proposed that a discrimination should be made between the
original holders of the public securities and their assignees and that a scale of depreciation be prepared
accordingly.” HECHT, supra note 125, at 184. James Madison, who would eventually become
Hamilton’s greatest opponent in getting his report passed by Congress, joined Burke’s proposal, “even
after Burke withdrew it . . .” Id. Madison would go on to later publicly criticize Hamilton on the
Congressional floor for not discriminating against the speculators, “dwelling at length upon the plight of
the widows, orphans and ex-soldiers who had been defrauded by unconscionable speculators.” MILLER,
supra note 124, at 240-41. “What would it profit the federal government, [Madison] asked, if in
140
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exchange for a new contract that reduced the interest that the government was
obligated to pay.149 In essence, Hamilton proposed a bailout of the securities to
further strengthen investor confidence, as the offer to buy them at face value was
substantially higher than the securities’ market value before his report was
submitted.150 Indeed, many of the speculators stood to gain nearly an eighty-five
percent profit, as it was not unusual for financially troubled veterans to have sold
their securities for fifteen cents on the dollar. 151 New securities would be issued
by the federal government to “. . .be exchanged for outstanding obligations at their
specie value at the rate of 100 to 1.”152
Similar to Paulson, Hamilton was proposing a wide scale bailout of the
United States financial system to promote stability and attract further
investment.153 However, with Hamilton, the scale in context was much larger.

gaining the rich, it lost the affections of the people – the certain consequence of permitting this ‘shower
of gold’ to fall upon the rich alone?” Id. The situation looked even more repulsive as the government
buyout of the speculators’ securities would in turn be paid for by the original veterans, as they would be
forced to pay federal taxes covering the purchase. The issue continued to boil over as many thought
that rich northern speculators were particularly preying upon the poorer veterans of the south and “were
urging refunding in order to obtain a huge unearned profit.” See MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.
Hamilton, a former veteran himself, put aside thoughts of the unfortunate situation to see the drastic
financial consequences that would come from not honoring the correct holder of the security. Id. The
security itself stated that “the amount thereon specified should be paid to the bearer, thereby creating,
said Hamilton, a contractual relationship that made them as much the property of bona fied purchases
‘as their houses or their lands, their hats or their coats.’” Id. The Continental Congress had previously
assured foreign investors that purchased such securities that they would be paid as the securities’
holder. Id. “If the federal government now attempted to discriminate in the name of equity between
different types of creditors, Hamilton was prepared to renounce all hope that foreigners would ever
again trust their money to the perfidious republicans across the Atlantic.” Id.
149
“In exchange for the security afforded by the funding system, Hamilton proposed to take what
he called ‘a stout Slice’ from the accrued interest owing the public creditors . . . Roughly, this deduction
amounted to an interest rate of 41/2 instead of 6 per cent upon the national debt.” MILLER, supra note
124, at 236. Two-thirds of the new deal would bear a six percent interest rate from 1791 as the final
one-third would not begin accruing interest until 1800. MYERS, supra note 127, at 61. “The arrears of
interest would be paid in securities bearing only [three] percent.” Id.
150
As the government redemption, or bailout, of the securities became more certain, the prices to
buy such securities skyrocketed to a twenty percent premium. MYERS, supra note 127, at 62. “Since
1787 there had been much speculative buying and selling of Continental and Confederation certificates
of indebtedness and bills of credit on the prospect that they might be redeemed by the new Federal
government. Speculation reached its climax while the funding program was under debate.” MORRIS,
supra note 137, at 286-87. “Since Hamilton’s report had been submitted to Congress, the speculators
had been busy buying all the securities in sight, even going to the length of chartering ships to carry
their agents to the southern states before the news of Hamilton’s report reached that region.” MILLER,
supra note 124, at 239.
151
JOHN S. PANCAKE, THOMAS JEFFERSON & ALEXANDER HAMILTON 161 (1974).
152
MYERS, supra note 127, at 61.
153
Jerry Bowyer of Forbes.com believed that Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit and Paulson’s
bailout plan were exceedingly analogous. Jerry Bowyer, Ron Paul Vs. Alexander Hamilton, FORBES,
Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/03/bailout-constitutional-hamilton-oped-cx_jb_1003
bowyer.html. Bowyer explained that:
[W]e’ve been here before. As George Washington was taking the oath of office,
U.S. credit markets were in full meltdown. America faced a credit crisis in which
debt obligations were being purchased by banking houses at [twenty-five] cents
on the dollar. Paulson’s predecessor was a guy named Hamilton, and Bush’s
predecessor was a guy named Washington. Hamilton wrote up a plan (called
“Report on the Public Credit”) in which he proposed that the Treasury
department buy the troubled securities from the private sector, thus restoring the
collapsing credit market . . . Hamilton’s case was simple. When any part of a
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Congress and the media continually called the $700 billion bailout plan
“unprecedented,” but if one looks closely at the Hamilton bailout, the context
shows that Hamilton asked for a taxpayer funded program that represented 4/5 of
the total national debt.154 In order for Paulson’s power under the bailout plan to
truly be unprecedented, the EESA would needed to have capped the bailout plan at
just over $8 trillion; more than eight times the current maximum. 155 Hamilton had
essentially asked for eight times the reach of Paulson’s power by only the second
point of his proposal; and still, he was far from done.
Third, and most controversially, Hamilton proposed a full-scale assumption,
or rather a further bailout, of the states’ aggregated $25 million debt.156 At first
glance this appeared to be a step in the wrong direction, as the bailout would raise
the national debt by more than fifty percent to almost $80 million with interest
included.157 However, Hamilton was confident that he could similarly proffer a
bargain with the holders of the state obligations to cut interest rates because of the
added confidence the new Constitution158 and his debt management system would
provide their securities.159 With these lesser interest rates, Hamilton believed his
debt management system would more than provide for steady repayment of the
national debt through an established “Sinking Fund,” which would “receive
nation participates in a massive repudiation of debt, the creditworthiness of the
whole nation is damaged. Hamilton saw this as a national problem in need of a
national solution. He argued that the whole nation would benefit from a return to
a well-functioning credit market, with low interest rates fueling growth.
Hamilton believed that if the Constitution gave executive power to the president,
then that included the authority to create specific institutions and programs
necessary to exercise that power . . . . [T]he Treasury bought up the paper,
America’s credit markets were restored quickly, and although we’ve had a few
rough patches, the ensuing 218 years have gone pretty well so far.
Id.
154
The domestic debt represented stood at $40 of the $51.6 million national debt. See MYERS,
supra note 127, at 61.
155
According to the Huffington Post and the U.S. National Debt Clock, the outstanding public debt
of the United States as of October 7, 2008 surpassed $10 trillion. See Scott Bittle & Jean Johnson,
National Debt Passes $10 Trillion, No One Notices, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-bittle-and-jean-johnson/national-debt-passes-10-t_b_132732.html;
see also U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
156
MILLER, supra note 124, at 235.
157
Id.
158
See PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 160-61. Specifically,
The new Constitution had conferred upon Congress the power to tax, and
Congress had already in the summer of 1789 enacted tariff duties on imports and
tonnage duties on shipping entering American ports. The assurance of an
income, the audacity and boldness of the young Secretary, the return of
prosperity after the depression of the 1780’s – all these things inspired
confidence . . . . It was this public confidence that resulted in the sale of the entire
bond issue within a few weeks of its being put on the market.
Id. at 161.
159
Instead of annual appropriations by the [state or federal] legislature toward debt
retirement, the creditors of the [federal] government were offered by Hamilton
permanent appropriations inviolably dedicated to the payment of interest and
principal. Every guarantee possible under the Federal Constitution against
popular ‘instability’ and ‘caprice’ was given public creditors . . .
MILLER, supra note 124, at 236. Indeed, the individuals that held the state war obligations were the
same speculators that held the national securities involved in the domestic debt portion of Hamilton’s
proposal. Id. at 234-35.
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surplus revenues from import and tonnage duties, interest saved on government
securities which were redeemed, and proceeds from the sale of public lands.”160
Hamilton’s proposal for the federal government to assume state debt was not
just an action to help the “the people of the United States [who] labored under a
heavy load of state debts” by way of taxes;161 it was a power play. Hamilton was
one of the chief proponents of the Federalist Party, which believed that the greater
power in the federal-state relationship should exist within the federal
government.162 Hamilton was sure that “if all the public creditors receive their
dues from one source, distributed by an equal hand, their interests will be the same.
And, having the same interests, they will unite in the support of the fiscal
arrangements of the Government.”163 Hamilton wanted this support to be centrally
united under the federal government and feared that with both the federal
government and the states having large debts on their books, both entities would be
forced to compete for the “allegiance of the creditor class and for the citizens’ tax
dollar.”164 Thus, a shift of taxpayer investment from the states to the federal
government meant a shift of taxpayer allegiance and support to the federal
government.165 In essence, Hamilton was asking Congress to vest him with the
power to single-handedly sway the coveted allegiance of the investor class
American by tying him to the financial success of the federal government.

160

MYERS, supra note 127, at 63.
MYERS, supra note 127, at 63.
161
MILLER, supra note 124, at 234.
162
Id. at 193, 195.
The principle theme of The Federalist is that the purpose of the Constitution is
the establishment of an energetic and efficient national government
notwithstanding the powers reserved to the states. Even though Hamilton
deferred to the new kind of federalism created by the Constitution, it is clear from
his essays that his sympathies lay wholly with nationalism. Reference to “the
streams of national power” and “the Fabric of American Empire” reveal that even
while he was justifying the federalist system he was dreaming of the centralized
system that he hoped would emerge from the chrysalis of federalism.
Id. at 195.
163
Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
Id.
The result, Hamilton feared, would be that the states would attempt to pre-empt
(as the Constitution, by recognizing concurrent taxation, permitted them to do)
the remaining objects of taxation and that the affluent citizens of the United
States would be divided against themselves, the state creditors seeking to
strengthen the states while the holders of federal securities endeavored to
aggrandize the powers and the revenues of the national government.
Id. Miller further explained:
Hamilton regarded concurrent taxation as “‘the Gordion-knot of our political
situation.”‘ In The Federalist he observed that the only way concurrent taxation
could be made workable was for each government to exercise “reciprocal
forbearance” by respecting the rights of the first occupant. As Secretary of the
Treasury, Hamilton left no doubt that he intended the federal government to do
the occupying, while forbearance was to be practiced by the states.
MILLER, supra note 124, at 235.
165
“With all the creditors, state and national, gathered into the fold of the federal government,
Hamilton’s vision of a powerful national government, supreme over the states, would begin to assume
concrete reality.” Id. Miller believed that “Hamilton’s constant objective was to bind [speculators and
investors] to the national government by the durable ties of ‘Ambition and Avarice.’” Id.
160
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Although Paulson’s request for authority under his bailout proposal was met
with a notable amount of controversy, it pales in comparison to the uproar which
followed Hamilton’s request for power under his report, especially as to the
assumption of state debts.166 James Madison, one of the leaders of the Republican
Party, opposed Hamilton’s proposal in Congress on the grounds that it forced
citizens of states that had already paid off a large amount of their war debts to now
pay federal taxes for the debts of other states. 167 Much like Paulson’s later
opposition, Hamilton’s opposition further feared that giving Hamilton the power to
assume state debts would greatly “magnify” his power, as well as that of the
federal government.168
Hamilton’s opponents won the initial battle of the state assumption portion
of his proposal, as it was defeated in the House thirty-one to twenty-nine.169 This
was not the proposal’s death however, but rather its transformation into a political
bargaining chip. Republican leaders James Madison and Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson agreed in a “behind-the-scenes” meeting with Hamilton to drop
their opposition of the state assumption bill in exchange for an agreement to
support having the “new national capital at a site on the banks of the Potomac.”170
With this alliance in place, the assumption of state debt became the final piece of
Hamilton’s proposal to become law. 171
With the measures of the Report on Public Credit passed, Hamilton was
authorized to use a great amount of discretion in managing 172 what stood as a
bailout worth 7/8 of the national debt – more than twelve times the amount Paulson
would ever control under the EESA.173 Additionally, with almost every significant
investor in the young nation now tied to Hamilton’s policy favoring the federal
government, Hamilton also single-handedly held the power to drastically shift
political favor to the federal government during the time when the nation’s
foundation was being laid. Although Paulson’s management of the TARP has had
substantial economic consequences, it will have nowhere near the lasting political

166
Many of the political leaders of the time felt that Hamilton’s Report on the Public Credit was
the first great controversy of the new nation, almost tearing the new union to bits. Id. at 238.
. . . Hamilton’s report fell like a bolt from the blue, utterly destroying the
President’s hope that his administration would inaugurate an era of good feelings.
In John Marshall’s words, Hamilton’s financial program “seemed to unchain all
those fierce passions which a high respect for the government and for those who
administered it, had in a great measure maintained.” Before the storm blew itself
out, some Americans were seriously considering disunion.
Id.
167
See PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 164-65. This complaint is not much different than the
complaints made by modern taxpayers who oppose paying taxes to bailout corporations.
168
See MORRIS, supra note 137, at 287.
169
PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 165.
169
PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 165.
170
MYERS, supra note 127, at 62; see also PANCAKE, supra note 151, at 166.
171
MYERS, supra note 127, at 62.
172
See id. at 63.
173
With the bailout of the domestic debt ($40 million) and state war debts ($30 million after
interest) represented $70 million of the $80 million national debt (the other $10 million being attributed
to the country’s foreign debt). See supra notes 128, 156-57. The EESA’s maximum bailout of $700
billion represented barely over seven percent of the current national debt, which continued to soar past
$10 trillion. See supra note 155.
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and legal effect that Hamilton’s use of this political power has had on the nation’s
governmental system. The evidence of this was quickly seen as Hamilton used the
exercise of his newly authorized power and influence in establishing the United
States’ first national bank.
B. The First National Bank
Hamilton’s next major goal in addressing the public debt was the
establishment of a public bank, a modern tool he believed the federal government
needed for ongoing financial management. 174 To this effect, Hamilton eventually
submitted his historic Report on a National Bank to Congress in late 1790,
effectively requesting that Congress establish the Bank of the United States. 175
With Congress having already firmly placed their trust in Hamilton by granting
him great power and discretion in managing the public debt crisis, the issue of the
bank itself was only moderately controversial as the bill proposing Hamilton’s
bank passed both houses of Congress convincingly. 176 However, State-rights
oriented leaders such as Madison and Jefferson recognized that lying within
Hamilton’s proposal was a request for immense authority as Hamilton implicitly
asserted that Congress had the constitutional authority to establish a national
bank.177
With the foundational scope of Congress’ constitutional authority at issue,
the debate that ensued became one of the most divisive and consequential political
power struggles in United States history. It was not a fight over a bank, but over
power. Since the bank bill had passed both houses of Congress, Madison and
Jefferson took their argument to President Washington who had yet to sign the bill
into law.178 Principally, Madison and Jefferson argued that Congress was
authorized by the Constitution to act only upon its enumerated power under Article
I and “measures indispensably necessary to give effect to [these enumerated]

174
MYERS, supra note 127, at 66. Specifically, Hamilton saw that a public bank would be a great
utility for the Treasury department in terms of “short term loans and for bills of exchange with which to
make payments” for foreign debt. Id. Additionally, Hamilton believed that a national bank would
substantially aide the country’s sprouting economy as it would grow the United States’ “circulating
capital” and “[facilitate] payments for business and government.” Id. Furthermore, “Hamilton hoped to
embody his ideal of a partnership between government and the business community by which
government would stimulate and direct the activities of businessmen and receive in return part of their
capital in the form of loans.” MILLER, supra note 124, at 260. Hamilton based his beliefs in a large
part on the historical effects of the Bank of England. Id.
175
Id.
176
See MILLER, supra note 124, at 264. Hamilton did ask for a considerable amount of executive
power in proposing the bank as it would be “bank of deposit, to act as the fiscal agent of the
government, and to loan the government money.” MILLER, supra note 124, at 261. Furthermore,
Hamilton’s proposal pushed the new country to unprecedented grounds among national governments, as
the federal government would purchase $2 million (twenty percent) of the bank’s stock; something even
England did not do with its own public bank. MYERS, supra note 127, at 67-68. Although the bank
was managed by private citizens (the government would only be allowed to appoint five of the twenty
five directors), Hamilton was personally authorized to inspect the bank’s books. Id. at 68. Even with
all of these increases in power and changes to the nation’s financial landscape opponents of the bank’s
bill “did not hope to defeat the bill, only to make some changes.” HECHT, supra note 125, at 198.
177
See MILLER, supra note 124, at 264.
178
Id.
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powers.”179 Accordingly, Madison and Jefferson argued that Congress could not
establish a national bank because it was neither an enumerated power under Article
I nor “indispensably necessary” to effectuate any of its other enumerated
powers.180 Hamilton held the exact opposite view, arguing that the Constitution
gave Congress general enumerated powers and the implied powers to effectuate
such enumerated powers in the most effective manner (what is “necessary and
proper,” not just as “indispensably necessary”).181 Washington sided with
Hamilton and his interpretation, signing the bank bill into law. 182
In establishing such substantial power for Congress, Hamilton again
procured great power for his own office by managing the public debt crisis through
the execution of the First Bank of the United States. Although the United States
Bank would have its ups and downs in subsequent time periods, Hamilton’s Report
on a National Bank was essentially the birth of the federal banking system; another
lasting thumbprint on the nation. In addition to further broadening his own
authority and influence on the national economy, Hamilton again tremendously
increased the power of the federal government within the federal-state relationship.
Congress now had been assured of far-reaching implied powers, which
consequentially won the Treasury Department an equally broad power of execution
(the lasting effect memorialized within the Supreme Court’s approval in
McCullough v. Maryland).183
C. The Whiskey Rebellion
Whereas Hamilton’s most financially consequential powers came through
the before mentioned public credit crisis bailouts and establishment of the Bank of
the United States, perhaps the greatest single display of Hamilton’s authority
during his time as the Treasury Secretary came in his leading the Western Army to
squash the “Whiskey Rebellion” in 1794.184 Hamilton, having taken full control of
managing the assumed state debts, convinced Congress to place a large federal
excise on manufactured whiskey in his Second Report on the Public Credit in
1791.185 Grumblings amongst whiskey manufacturers began immediately upon the
passage of the excise, eventually climaxing in 1794 within western counties of
Pennsylvania through armed actions against Hamilton’s revenue officers and an
assault on Pittsburgh.186
179

Id.
Id.
181
See id. at 263-65. Hamilton believed that “the Bank of the United States was a necessary and
proper means of carrying into effect the regulation of commerce between the states and of providing for
the public credit and defense.” Id. at 266.
182
MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.
182
MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.
183
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
184
See MILLER, supra note 124, at 406-09.
185
Id. at 396. Hamilton had originally proposed the whiskey excise in his First Report on the
Public Credit to no avail. Id. However, with Hamilton’s power and discretion in managing the
assumed states’ debts now fully in motion, Congress “had very little to say in the matter . . . [and] the
excise became law in early 1791.” Id. The excise on whiskey was a costly eight cents per gallon, or
about “twenty-five percent of the net value of the product.” Id. at 397.
186
Id. at 405.
180
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After personally convincing the Supreme Court that the federal government
needed to resort to force to successfully oppose the insurrection, Hamilton set out
with President Washington to lead the 13,000-man army (a force roughly the size
of the Continental Army that fought in the Revolutionary War) 187 against the
“whiskey boys.”188 Once it had been decided that the army would have to cross
the Allegheny Mountains to meet the insurrection forces, Washington returned to
Philadelphia to see to other pressing matters. 189 Although Governor Lee of
Virginia was supposed to have been the ranking official with Washington’s
departure (as it was a multi-state militia force), Hamilton was reputed to have been
“the real leader” of the forces and would “[run] the show.”190 “Hamilton issued
orders in his own name” and even rebuked the acting governor of Pennsylvania,
General Thomas Mifflin (another supposed ranking official). 191 It was reported
that Hamilton “indulged in the airs of a commander-in-chief and, capitalizing upon
his friendship with Washington, made his influence felt in every department of the
army.”192 Soldiers of the army could hardly believe “[t]hat they were in the
presence of a mere Secretary of Treasury.”193 Hamilton led the troops across the
Alleghany Mountains and captured 150 members of the insurrection (including the
“whiskey boys” spokesman Hugh Henry Brackenridge); effectively dispersing the
opposing forces and ending the rebellion.194
D. Final Summary and Comparison of Alexander Hamilton’s Powers
It is clear that in context, the EESA’s $700 billion capped bailout did not
give Paulson the “unprecedented” power that many had claimed. In the face of an
analogously dire financial crisis, Hamilton was given greater deference to establish
and manage a bailout of the United States financial system that was worth 7/8 of
the nation’s total debt; an amount comparatively twelve times larger in scope than
the bailout under Paulson.195 Furthermore, Hamilton used his authority over state
debt to tie the United States’ investor class to the federal government, ultimately
leveraging this authority to establish a national bank and secure broad implied

Revenue officers were terrorized – sometimes at gun point – into resigning their
offices; United States marshals were forcibly prevented from serving processes
upon rioters; and the United States mail was seized by armed bands. Early in
August, 1794, a meeting of armed men was held at Braddock’s Field and
preparations were made to attack Pittsburgh; the assault was averted only when
the citizens, realizing that they could not withstand the attackers, marched out to
join them.
Id.
187
See NationMaster.com, Whiskey Rebellion, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/
Whiskey-Rebellion (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
188
MILLER, supra note 124, at 406-07.
189
Id. at 408-09.
190
Id. at 409.
191
See id; Encyclopedia.com, Thomas Mifflin Facts, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1Mifflin.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
192
MILLER, supra note 124, at 409.
193
Id.
194
See id. at 409-13.
195
See supra text accompanying note 173.
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powers for Congress in the process.196 With the momentum of such authority and
power, Hamilton raised heavy excises for the federal debt and led an army of
13,000 men to defend his purposes.197 Thus, Hamilton was granted far more
authority by Congress and exercised such power to a far greater extent (and to a
much greater consequence) than was ever possible for Paulson.
The principle of a congressional pattern was established with Hamilton;
extreme financial and economic challenges led Congress to grant the acting
Treasury Secretary equally extreme measures of authority to seek resolution.
Although Hamilton is likely to have been the most powerful and influential
proponent of this pattern, the next section of this article will show that he really
was just the beginning. Section V will shed light upon the continuation of this
pattern by briefly examining a few of the more notable Treasury Secretaries that
have faced critical financial challenge in subsequent United States history; thus
putting Paulson not at the front, but rather at the back of a rather large line.
V.

THE LONG LINE OF IMMENSLY POWERFUL TREASURY
SECRETARIES DURING TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS

A. Salmon P. Chase and the Financial Crisis of the Civil War (1861-1864)
The five years leading to the civil war were not only wrought with bitter
political conflict, but also severe financial and economic crisis. 198 On the heels of
such crises, the national debt had doubled during 1857-1860 to $60 million, with
the Treasury balance hovering meagerly around $3.6 million.199 In order to meet
current obligations, the Treasury resorted to paying exorbitant twelve percent
interest rates.200 Even congressmen went without salary for several weeks in
1860.201 With this load on the nation’s back, or rather on the ‘Union’s’ back, the
United States prepared to wage and finance the most expensive war in its young
history.202
When President Abraham Lincoln appointed Salmon P. Chase as his
Treasury Secretary in 1861, he essentially handed him a $75 million national debt,
a paper-thin checkbook, and the guarantee that the looming war would only make
matters worse.203 Chase was confident of a quick defeat of the Southern Army and
proposed an optimistic $320 million revenue plan for the next year to be

196

MILLER, supra note 124, at 267.
Id. at 406-07.
198
There had been a large financial panic in 1857 that caused banks to fail nationwide and sunk the
United States into recession through the beginning of the Civil War. See generally JAMES L. HUSTON,
THE PANIC OF 1857 AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 13-34 (Louisiana State University Press
1987).
199
MYERS, supra note 127, at 149.
200
IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
FINANCE, 1865-1879, at 13 (Princeton University Press 1964).
201
MYERS, supra note 127, at 149.
202
UNGER, supra note 200, at 14-15.
203
See ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL WAR
AND RECONSTRUCTION 16-17 (The Johns Hopkins Press 1959).
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accomplished in large part by issuing federal securities. 204 However, the Union’s
defeat at the Battle of Bull Run in July of 1861 assured a long war with the
Southern Army205 and illuminated just how insufficient Chase’s financial
projections had been.206 “The soldiers needed to be paid” and Chase had to find a
way to do it.207
1.

The Birth of Greenbacks: Chase’s Authority to Print Money Out
of Thin Air

Chase reported the anticipated Treasury deficit in his Annual Report in 1861,
causing a public panic that froze gold trading on the market, which in turn caused
further crisis as the gold specie that backed the national coin became scarce in
Treasury reserves.208 The Treasury did the unthinkable: it ceased to pay coin for
its debt obligations and dropped the “gold standard” for the foreseeable future. 209
With the revenue crisis now further compounded by the lack of physical money,
the federal government’s growing war debt appeared impossible. Chase needed
more power, new power; he needed to make money appear out of thin air.
In the face of such a meltdown, that’s exactly what Congress let him do. By
way of three Legal Tender Acts from 1862-1863, Congress authorized Chase to
issue and spend the nation’s first non-specie “legal tender paper money” or
“greenbacks” up to the staggering amount of $450 million.210 For the first time
ever, a Treasury Secretary paid for debt through a currency that was backed by
promises alone.211
Essentially, Congress granted Chase perhaps the greatest power a Treasury
Secretary could ever have asked for, the ability to print money at will. The United
States $10,000 bill features a portrait of Chase as a monument to this tremendous
power and to the ramped inflation it would later cause. 212 However, the monument
which would perhaps best depict the magnitude of Chase’s greenback power was
later erected by Chase himself, as he would rule as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court that the authority given to him under the Legal Tender Act
to issue the greenbacks (the very power that he had pleaded for and exercised only
seven years earlier) was unconstitutional. 213
204

Id. at 19.
See JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK: THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA
219 (Henry Holt & Company 2003).
206
SHARKEY, supra note 203, at 19-20.
207
GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 219.
208
UNGER, supra note 200, at 14.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 14-15.
211
GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 220.
Secretary Chase, who only six months earlier had warned against the danger of
irredeemable paper, now took the position of “regretting exceedingly” the
“necessity,” and accepting it as “the mode most useful and least hurtful” to the
general interest . . . . The Act . . . provided for an issue of notes to be “lawful
money and legal tender in payment of all debts public and private . . . .”
MYERS, supra note 127, at 155.
212
GOODWIN, supra note 205, at 220.
213
See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
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Chase and the Nation’s First Federal Income Tax

In order to further boost revenue for a war that cost nearly $2 million per
day,214 Chase proposed that Congress install the nation’s first federal income
tax.215 Congress agreed to the proposal and granted Chase the truly unprecedented
power to collect taxes on income through the Revenue Act of 1861.216 Congress
further empowered Chase to collect the nation’s first income tax by creating the
Internal Revenue Board (which would later become the Internal Revenue Service)
in 1862.217 Similar to Chase’s greenback power, his monumental power to collect
income taxes was later ruled to be unconstitutional (only to be brought back to life
in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution). 218
3.

Chase’s National Banking System

Congress’ authorization for the issuance of greenbacks concurrently
provided Chase with a platform to seek further power for a government-backed
national banking system that would provide for a common national currency. 219
Indeed, Chase did more than advocate for such a system, he “. . . demanded it as an
instrument of war policy and hinted that he would resign if the scheme did not
receive Congressional approval.”220 Upon President Lincoln’s further insistence,
Congress passed the National Bank Act in 1863,221 authorizing Chase to directly
involve the United States in banking for the first time in its history. 222 Chase’s
National Bank Act was a move so vast and dramatic that one author believes that,
“[i]t was only in the midst of such a war that such a bill could have been
passed.”223
4.

Salmon P. Chase Conclusion

In terms of receiving “unprecedented power,” there are few, if any, Treasury
Secretaries that are comparable to Salmon Chase. In order to meet the financial
crisis surrounding the Civil War period, Congress authorized Chase to issue and
spend $450 million of non-specie greenbacks, collect taxes from income, and
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establish a national banking system.224 All three of these powers were firsts in
American history and proved to be tremendously powerful tools for the Treasury
Secretary to influence the national economy.
B. William McAdoo: World War I and the European Investment Crisis
(1913-1918)
The buildup to World War I brought unease amongst investors worldwide.
Unfortunately, a great bulk of this uneasiness fell upon the United States, as it was
one of the few nations of financial power that did not have a central banking
system in place.225 In the spring of 1914, European investors finally panicked and
began cashing in their United States based securities and currency for gold specie
at catastrophic levels, causing a full-scale gold run.226 This created an immediate
financial crisis, as the Treasury Department and major banks would not be able to
cash out the entirety of the demand. 227 With the nation’s gold and financial
confidence bleeding uncontrollably, the United States dollar and its financial
markets were quickly brought to the edge of a freefall. 228
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo needed to act quickly and
decisively. On July 31, 1914, McAdoo ordered the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”) to be shut down to prevent any further run on capital. 229 Many were
outraged as McAdoo’s action admittedly fell somewhere high upon the tyrannical
spectrum; however, it did ultimately serve its purpose as the gold run abroad was
quickly halted.230 With such financial consequences on the line, Congress left the
action unchallenged, as McAdoo would continue to keep the NYSE closed for an
unprecedented four straight months.231
While the foreign security problem had been met, McAdoo still needed to
stop the bank run domestically. McAdoo decided to essentially bailout the United
States financial system by pumping the market full of “emergency currency,” thus
allowing banks to continue to supply capital while retaining gold specie. 232 Unlike
many of his predecessors, McAdoo did not have to plead with Congress for this
power, as Congress had already established this magnified authority for Treasury
Secretary George Cortelyou233 in the recent banking crisis of 1907 through the
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See supra note 210, 216, 221.
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Alrdrich-Vreeland Act.234 Congress submitted to the necessity of the new
mounting crisis and continued to let this bailout power run to McAdoo as he
eventually issued the emergency currency. 235 In addition to this national bailout,
McAdoo would further organize a bailout of New York City’s massive foreign
debt, a move that one author called the single-handed introduction of the “[T]oo
Big Too Fail doctrine” into the American financial system.236
Having stopped the bleeding of American gold and confidence, McAdoo
wanted to pull the nation (and its gold reserves) up from financial gloom and back
into prosperity. McAdoo pushed Congress’ deference even further by persuading
them to establish the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, a government entity that
would provide domestic shippers insurance to ship American cargo across the warridden Atlantic Ocean to Europeans that were in great need of products like
cotton.237 With McAdoo’s Bureau hedging the risky voyages, European traders
paid for American goods with much of the gold that had been retracted. 238
McAdoo’s act of restoring the nation’s gold reserves allowed banks to retire the
emergency currency and gave him the confidence to reopen the NYSE. 239 With
stability in the national market restored, McAdoo pushed the nation into the
powerful realm of global financial lenders as he introduced the first United States
Federal Reserve Banking System in the fall of 1914.240
C. William H. Woodin (1933) & Henry Morgenthau Jr. (1934-1945):
Control over Banks and Gold During the Great Depression
The Great Depression presented the United States with a frightening
monetary crisis in 1933. With the American dollar actually depreciating,
Americans frantically exchanged whatever currency or security they could for
gold.241 This widespread demand drained the Federal Reserve’s gold supply
almost past the point of the legal minimum and forced newly-elected President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to take immediate action. 242 Roosevelt relied upon the
World War I Trading with the Enemy Act (“TEA”) to order that all commercial
banks be closed until his administration could approve reopening on a bank-bybank basis.243 Essentially, Roosevelt declared a war upon the Great Depression.
Widespread criticism arose over whether the TEA actually granted such power,
causing Roosevelt to seek post-action confirmation from Congress through an
amendment to the TEA.244
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The amendment was proposed as the Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933
(“EBRA”), a bill that would not only have confirmed Roosevelt’s previous actions,
but would also have granted the President and his Treasury Secretary William
Woodin great unilateral power going forward. 245 Congress met within an
emergency session and passed the EBRA on a “voice vote” without actually seeing
or debating the text of the bill.246 With the weight of the worst economic crisis in
history bearing down upon the United States, Congress once again deferred and
greatly magnified the Treasury Secretary’s power.247 In order to meet the
monetary crisis, the EBRA authorized Woodin to confiscate “any or all gold coin,
gold bullion, and gold certificates” from any individual or corporation.248
Additionally, the EBRA allowed Roosevelt to grant Woodin the sole discretion and
authority to decide which commercial banks could reopen. 249 Essentially, Woodin
now personally controlled all the gold and banks in the entire country without any
check on his power.
Woodin fell ill and passed this power to Henry Morgenthau Jr. in 1934. 250
Morgenthau soon discovered that because he physically controlled all the gold in
the United States (which had been turned over to the federal government by
executive order), he also reigned over the gold markets. 251 Morgenthau met with
Roosevelt every morning by his bedside to eat breakfast and arbitrarily set the
price of gold in an increasing trend to encourage inflation.252 All the while,
Congress continued to differ without challenge. Morgenthau described the process
in his diary:
The actual price of gold on any given day made little difference. The
amounts settled on were generally arbitrary. One day, for instance, the bedside
conference decided on a rise of [twenty-one] c[ents]; “It’s a lucky number,” the
President remarked, “because it’s three times seven.”
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the assemblies upon its introduction. At 8:30 p.m., Congress hurriedly put the President’s proposal to a
vote and overwhelmingly passed it. The vote was taken when every bank in the country had been
closed for four straight days, and there was enormous pressure on Congress to allow the banks to open.
Unable to justify a delay to debate, several congressmen were pressured to pass the bill even though
they opposed many of its provisions. Due to the short period of time prior to the enactment, some
congressmen’s votes were not recognized and there was no roll call vote allowed in the House. To this
day, the legislative intent behind the bill remains unclear. Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent
Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 266–67
(2000).
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See BLANCHARD, supra note 241.
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The United Stated Department of the Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/history/
secretaries/hmorgenthaujr.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
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. . . If anybody ever knew how we set the gold price through a combination
of lucky numbers and so forth, I think they would really be frightened. 253
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been no great gap between Alexander Hamilton and Henry
Paulson. Since the Treasury Department’s creation, financial crisis has almost
continually caused Congress to magnify the Treasury Secretary’s authority to great
and “unprecedented” heights. Members of this elite line have initiated and
controlled massive public and private bailouts,254 printed money at will,255 flooded
financial markets with emergency currency, 256 controlled financial markets,257 shut
down financial markets,258 confiscated all the gold in the country, 259 and led a
13,000-man army to enforce treasury excises. 260 Paulson was simply the most
current member of this growing line, a recent proponent of the Congressional
pattern to inflate Treasury Secretary power during times of financial crisis.
Indeed, Congress granted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson historic
authority to address the 2008 financial crisis through the EESA’s $700 billion
capped bailout plan. However, as broad and consequential as this authority was,
analysis of past financial crises and Treasury Secretary authority has shown that
such heightened power was by no means “unprecedented.” In fact, the EESA was
proof that the longstanding Congressional pattern to magnify Treasury Secretary
authority during financial crisis will likely continue indefinitely. This conclusion
is substantially relevant to the business, legal, and political realms for two main
reasons.
First, the business, banking, and finance world should be aware that financial
crises have frequently resulted in Treasury Secretaries becoming intimately
involved in either greatly empowering or greatly restricting business and market
action. Although such actions have been very contextual, this history gives the
business world a general precedent to rely upon in predicting future intervention
and planning accordingly. At the very least, for planning purposes, such history
should prevent members of the business world from ruling out any plausible
Treasury Secretary intervention measure on the premise that such a measure would
be too powerful or “unprecedented.”261
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For example, this principle was immediately applicable to Paulson’s successor, Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner, in his request for broadened authority in 2009. In his efforts to further
address the financial crisis stemming from 2008 and to ensure a broader capability to address future
financial crises, Geithner requested authority from Congress to be able to “seize large insurers,
investment firms and hedge funds, leaping beyond [the] present authority to seize only banks.” FOX
NEWS, Geithner Seeks Power to Seize Imperiled Firms, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
elections/2009/03/24/fed-treasury-chief-grilled-aig/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). Essentially, Geithner
proposed that the federal government assume the new authority to seize almost any financial institution
254
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Second, Congress and other political leaders must recognize that American
history has shown that financial crises often necessitate a concentration of power in
the Treasury Secretary. Recognition that a longstanding Congressional trend exists
to greatly empower Treasury Secretaries during times of crisis should give future
political leaders confidence to empower the Treasury Secretary if this action would
be the most effective and efficient solution to a crisis. This recognition should
prevent the unnecessary political delay of congressional leaders getting hung-up on
hesitations that empowering the Treasury Secretary is somehow novel or unAmerican. Whereas Congress must always delegate power responsibly with
measures of oversight and checks on unilateral power, recognition of Treasury
Secretary history should also prevent Congress from over-burdening or
‘handcuffing’ the Secretary when the crisis calls for an efficient use of power.
Congress must remember that the Treasury Secretary’s capability to act quickly
and efficiently is the very aspect that sets the office apart as an effective tool.
This is not to say that this historical precedent mandates that Congress
recklessly give the Treasury Secretary power for the sake of granting power, as
instances such as Salmon Chase’s greenback power proved to have long-lasting
detrimental effects on the economy. 262 Rather, this historical precedent simply
calls political leaders to not be so hesitant to consider the option that Congress has
used to address so many of this nation’s crises: a grant of power, even
tremendously broad and “unprecedented” power, to the Treasury Secretary.

that “totter[ed]” on the line of failure. See Binyamin Applebaum & David Cho, U.S. Seeks Expanded
Power to Seize Firms, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/23/ AR2009032302830.html. Many recognized that “[g]iving the
[Geithner] authority over a broader range of companies would mark a significant shift from the existing
model of financial regulation, which relies on independent agencies that are shielded from the political
process.” Id. On cue, this recognition caused many in the media to quickly throw around their favorite
‘U’ word. See, e.g., Suzanne Malveux, Geithner to Seek Unprecedented Powers, Insiders Say, CNN
POLITICS, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/24/geithner.powers/ index.html.
Political leaders echoed these sentiments as House Minority Leader John Boehner told reporters that
Geithner’s request was asking for “an unprecedented grab of power.” FOX NEWS, supra note 162. As
shocked as everyone appeared to have been, the conscious observer and planner should have been
completely prepared for Geithner’s request no matter how “unprecedented” it was, as it was a plausible
option given the context of the crisis leading to the request. Although Geithner’s request asked for new
authority, it was a logical step as non-depository financial institutions (those which the FDIC did not
have seizure authority over) were enormous contributors to the financial crisis. Id. Geithner pointed
out the logic himself. “As we have seen with AIG, distress at large, interconnected, non-depository
financial institutions can pose systematic risks just as distress at banks can. The administration
proposes legislation to give the U.S. government the same basic set of tools for addressing financial
distress at non-banks as it has in the bank context.” Id.
262
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.

